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Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions
and Their Misuse in the Debate Over
Regulatory Reform
Lisa Heinzerling*
Introduction

John D. Graham is perhaps the most powerful policy analyst in
America today. As the head of the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the Office of Management and
Budget, Graham oversees White House review of all of the major
regulations proposed by dozens of federal agencies.' Although he has
been in this job for less than one year, Graham already has begun to
exert a large influence on the shape and scope of federal regulation. He
has given notice to the agencies that he essentially intends to veto any
rules he deems inconsistent with OIRA's economic precepts and
methodologies, 2 and indeed he has already sent two rules back to the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on account of what he
described as inadequate analysis. 3 These events could presage an era
of White House involvement with agency rulemaking not seen since the
days of Dan Quayle's much-criticized Council on Competitiveness.
Before coming to OIRA, John Graham was the director of the
Harvard Center for Risk Analysis. In that capacity, Graham was a
Lisa Heinzerling is a Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center. She earned
her A.B. at Princeton University in 1983 and her J.D. at University of Chicago Law School in
1987. This article expands upon testimony the author submitted to the Senate's Governmental
Affairs Committee concerning John Graham's nomination to be head of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the Office of Management and Budget.
Email: heinzerl@law.georgetown.edi.
1 Exec. Or. 12866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993) (reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601, app. at 557-61
(1994)).
Memorandum from John D. Graham, OIRA Administrator, to President's Management
2
Council (Sept. 20, 2001) (available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/ omb/inforeg/oirareviewprocess.html>).
3
See Letter from John. D. Graham, OIRA Administrator, to the Honorable Jeffrey R.
Holmstead (Sept. 24, 2001) (available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/
spark-engines-epa-sep2001.html>); Letter from John D. Graham, OIRA Administrator, to
Tracy Mehan, Assistant Administrator for Water (Oct. 2, 2001) (available at
<http://vvw.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/epawater-quality- rtnltr.html>).
*
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leading proponent of reforming risk regulation through increased
reliance on cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis. In his
collaborative research with Tammy 0. Tengs, Graham attempted to
show that our current life-saving priorities squandered opportunities to
save many more lives with the same resources we now spend. Perhaps
most famously, Tengs and Graham claimed that over 60,000 more lives
could be saved in this country every year if we shifted resources from
4
cost-ineffective life-saving programs to cost-effective ones.
Tengs and Graham's collaborative work has had a large influence on
debates over health, safety, and environmental regulation. In particular,
Tengs and Graham's claims regarding the cost-effectiveness of various
life-saving interventions and the life-saving potential of a rearrangement
of our life-saving priorities have been widely circulated and widely
accepted by other scholars, elected representatives, and the interested
public. These claims are, however, exceedingly problematic for four
basic reasons. First, Tengs and Graham's results are skewed by their
mistaken assumption that many environmental programs that were
never implemented, nor even proposed, were in fact implemented. The
practical effect of this mistaken assumption would have been to "take"
money from unimplemented programs and "give" it to other programs,
but since the money "taken" was not in fact being spent, it could not be
"given" to other programs. Second, Tengs and Graham's set of lifesaving interventions is exceedingly narrow; for example, the
interventions representing toxin control are almost entirely comprised
of two regulatory programs that have been defunct for many years.
Third, Tengs and Graham's research ignores many benefits of
regulation, particularly environmental regulation. Benefits that do not
consist of quantified human lives saved are ignored in Tengs and
Graham's calculus. Finally, Tengs and Graham's research rests on
controversial moral judgments about whose life is worth saving.
Moreover, Dr. Graham has perpetuated and encouraged a
misinterpretation of his and Tengs' data, one that wrongly holds that
these data show that federal regulations result in the "statistical
Tammy 0. Tengs & John D. Graham, The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social
Investments in Life-Saving, in Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved: Getting Better Results from
Regulation 167, 172 (Robert W. Hahn ed., Oxford University Press & AEI Press 1996)
[hereinafter Opportunity Costs].
4
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murder" (to borrow Graham's phrase) of 60,000 Americans every year.
Dr. Graham's misuse of his own data in the service of an anti-regulatory
agenda warrants assiduous monitoring - by scholars, the public
interest community, and the federal agencies themselves - of his
activities as head of OIRA. There is reason to believe that a substantial
segment of Congress shares this skeptical attitude toward Graham: his
nomination to lead OIRA received more negative votes in the Senate
(thirty-seven) than any of President Bush's other nominees for positions
concerning health, safety, and environmental regulation.
Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and 60,000 Lives
Tammy Tengs and John Graham's collaborative research on the
cost-effectiveness of various life-saving interventions consists of two
major studies. The first looked at the cost-effectiveness of over 500 lifesaving interventions. The second considered the opportunity costs, in
terms both of lives saved and money spent, of the pattern of life-saving
investments found in the first study. John Graham has aptly
summarized the combined message of this pair of studies: by spending
life-saving resources the way we do now, we commit the "statistical
murder" of approximately 60,000 Americans every year. These 60,000
people are the people who, according to Tengs and Graham, might
have been saved if a more cost-effective pattern of life-saving
interventions had been pursued. This section briefly describes each
study and its conclusions.

Five-HundredLife-Saving Interventionsand Their Cost-Effectiveness
In research supervised by Dr. Graham, graduate student Tammy
0. Tengs and several co-authors analyzed the costs and benefits of 587
life-saving measures. 5 These measures fall into three broad categories:
fatal injury reduction, toxin control, and medicine. 6 The specific
measures included under the heading of fatal injury reduction
encompass such things as airplane safety, automobile safety, and fire
prevention. The category of toxin control includes measures to control
5 Tammy 0. Tengs et al., Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their CostEffectiveness, 15 Risk Analysis 369 (1995) [hereinafter Five-Hundred Life-Saving
Interventions] (I refer hereafter only to Tengs and Graham as the authors of this study, as they
are the study's lead and senior authors).
Id. at 373-384 (listing interventions analyzed in this study).
6
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arsenic, asbestos, benzene, radiation, and other hazardous substances.
Finally, the category of medicine includes a wide variety of preventive
and curative measures ranging from vaccinations to advice about
quitting smoking. 7 Tengs and Graham's reported criterion for the
inclusion of a life-saving intervention in this study was the availability of
quantitative data on the intervention's costs and benefits. 8 Tengs and
Graham also required that the studies be written in English and contain
9
information on interventions pertinent to the United States.
In this study, Tengs and Graham found that the costs per year of
life saved varied widely across interventions and often reached very high
levels. They also found that toxin control was the least cost-effective of
the categories of life-saving interventions they considered. 1 0
Specifically, they found that the costs per life-year saved of toxin
control ranged from less than or equal to zero (meaning that some
interventions saved more money than they cost) to as high as $99
billion for every year of life saved. They found that many toxin controls
cost tens of millions of dollars for every year of life they saved.' 1
The Opportunity Costs ofHaphazardSocialInvestments in Life-Saving
In a study building upon "Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions
and Their Cost-Effectiveness," Tengs and Graham set out "to assess the
opportunity costs of our present pattern of social investment in lifesaving." 12 In other words, they purported to ask, what do we give up
in addressing life-threatening risks the way we now do?
This second study, entitled "The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard
Social Investments in Life-Saving," considered a subset of the 587
interventions included in "Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions." In
this study, Tengs and Graham reportedly required that data on costs
and effectiveness be national in scope; thus, the number of interventions
included in the second study dropped from 587 to 185.13 Ninety of
7
8

Id.
Id. at 370.

9
10
I1
12
13

Id.
Id. at 371.
Id. at 375-78, app. A.
Opportunity Costs, supra n. 4, at 168.
Id. at 169.
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these interventions (almost half of all those included in the study) were
toxin control measures that would, if proposed or implemented, fall
within the jurisdiction of the EPA.14
Tengs and Graham's conclusions in this second study are now
famous. They found that if resources now spent on life-saving
investments were held constant but were redirected "so as to maximize
lives saved," the country could save "an additional 60,200 lives" as
15
compared to the number we now save with these investments.
Alternatively, holding constant the number of lives saved but
redirecting resources to minimize expenditures on this life-saving
activity, we could save $31.1 billion per year while saving the same
16
number of lives.
The vast majority of lives saved through Tengs and Graham's
proposed reallocation of life-saving resources occurred in the categories
of fatal injury reduction and medicine; over half of the life-saving
potential was found in the medical category alone. 17 Only about 5%
of the life-saving benefits found by Tengs and Graham came from the
category of toxin control. 18 Even more strikingly, less than 2% of the
total life-saving benefits found by Tengs and Graham could be
obtained by reallocating EPA's regulatory resources within EPA. 19
Taking Money From Unimplemented Programs
Tengs and Graham's studies both include many life-saving
measures that have never been undertaken by anyone. As Tengs and
Graham acknowledged in "Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions,"
that study includes life-saving measures that are fully implemented,
"those that are only partially implemented, and those that are
20
implemented not at all."
14 See Tammy 0. Tengs, Optimizing Societal Investments in the Prevention of Premature
Death 150, app. Q (unpublished Doctor of Science thesis, Harvard Univ. June 1994)
(indicating that ninety interventions based on "EPA Regulation" were considered in the
dissertation which formed the basis of Tengs and Graham's "Opportunity Costs" study)
[hereinafter Optimizing Societal Investments].
15 Opportunity Costs, supra n. 4, at 172.
16 Id. at 173.
17 Optimizing Societal Investments, supra n. 14, at 144-46, apps. K-M (showing life-years
saved in separate categories of fatal injury reduction, medicine, and toxin control).
18 Id. at 146, app. M.
19 Id. at 150, app. Q.
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In fact, a very large number of the toxin controls studied by Tengs
and Graham in that article were never implemented by any agency,
frequently for the very reason that their costs were thought to exceed
their benefits. An equally large number of these controls were never
even proposed by any agency. Indeed, although nine of the ten most
expensive life-saving interventions in the entire study involved toxin
control, not one of those nine interventions was ever implemented by a
regulatory agency. 2 1 The most expensive intervention on Tengs and
Graham's list - the control of chloroform from paper mills,
purportedly costing $99 billion per year of life saved - was never even
proposed. 2 2 To determine which regulatory interventions on Tengs
and Graham's list were implemented (or even proposed) by the relevant
regulatory agency, one must consult the original studies providing the
23
costs and effectiveness data on which Tengs and Graham relied.
Similarly, of the 90 environmental measures included in "The
Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social Investments in Life-Saving"
(representing almost half of all the measures considered), only eleven
were ever implemented by the relevant agency, EPA. In other words, 79
of the environmental measures included in this study were never
implemented. Most of these were rejected (or never even proposed) by
EPA itself.2 4 For example, almost half of the environmental measures
included in the study are bans on certain asbestos products. As the
study on which Tengs and Graham relied for their data on the costs
and effectiveness of these measures clearly states, however, ten of these
products were never in fact banned by EPA. 2 5 As for the remaining
twenty-one asbestos product bans on Tengs and Graham's list, all were
26
overturned in a single controversial judicial decision.
20

Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions, supra n. 5, at 372.

21

See Optimizing Societal Investments, supra n. 14, at 25, tbl. 8 (showing "Ten Most

Expensive Interventions").
22 See Ralph A. Luken, Toxic Pollutants, in Efficiency in Environmental Regulation: A
Benefit-Cost Analysis of Alternative Approaches 249 (Kluwer Academic Publishers 1990)
(referring to chapter as study of "potential regulations").
23 See Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions, supra n. 5, at 385-90.
24 See George L. Van Houtven & Maureen L. Cropper, When Is a Life Too Costly to
Save?, Policy Research Working Paper 1260, tbl. 1 (Environment, Infrastructure, and
Agriculture Division, Policy Research Department, World Bank, March 1994).
25 Id.
26

See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1230 (5th Cir. 1991) (overturning
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In "The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social Investments in
Life-Saving," Tengs and Graham assert that they considered the extent
to which the interventions they discuss have been implemented.
For each intervention, we supplemented cost-effectiveness
data with two measures of the degree to which that
intervention was implemented. For the subset of
interventions where a "go/no-go" decision was made (for
example, laws, regulations, or uniform building codes), we
collected binary data on the implementation decision
(Bijk). Because some degree of implementation can exist
even in the presence of a "no-go" decision, or can be
absent even with a "go" decision, however, we also
collected data on "percent implementation" (Pijk). We
defined that measure as "the percent of people in the
target population who received the life-saving intervention
as of 1992."27
Tengs and Graham then explain that to gather information on
"percent implementation," they consulted two independent experts. In
estimating how many women over the age of twenty receive annual
cervical cancer screening, for example, they consulted two experts in
28
cervical cancer.
Unfortunately, however, Tengs and Graham do not, in their study,
give any information as to which measures they considered
implemented, which unimplemented, and which partially
implemented, and this author's requests for this information have gone
unanswered by Tengs and Graham. However, in a statement filed in
response to this author's testimony on John Graham's nomination to be
head of OIRA, Tammy Tengs stated that the "Opportunity Costs"
study assumed zero implementation for only twenty of the 185
interventions considered. 2 9 Yet, as noted, 79 of the environmental
EPA's nationwide ban on asbestos products in part because the court disagreed with the
agency's cost-benefit analysis).
27 Opportunity Costs, supra n. 4, at 169-70.
28 Id. at 170.
29 Sen. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, Hearing on the Nomination of John D. Graham
as Adim'r of the Office of Info. and Regulatory Affairs at the Office of Mgmt. and Budget,
107th Cong., at 8 (forthcoming 2001) (testimony of Dr. Tammy Tengs) [hereinafter "Tengs'
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interventions alone were never implemented. The reasons for Tengs
and Graham's apparent assumption that at least 59 rules that were never
issued were nevertheless implemented remain mysterious. 3 0 For
example, based on information provided in related research, it is clear
that Tengs and Graham assumed that EPA's nationwide ban on
asbestos was fully implemented - which, as noted above, it was not.
Here is the sum total of what Tengs has had to say most recently on
the point: "Toxin control interventions that were never promulgated (or
even considered) by the EPA might nevertheless have some percent
implementation, at least according to the experts we interviewed. ' 3 1
Thus it appears that Tengs and Graham assumed that even absent
government regulation, firms were voluntarily undertaking the
environmentally protective measures discussed in their study.
It is highly unlikely, however, that a firm would voluntarily
undertake toxin controls that cost as much money as Tengs and
Graham say they cost. Most economists would argue that a firm would
undertake such controls only if it could save money by doing so, yet
the cost figures cited by Tengs and Graham hardly show money-saving
potential. Furthermore, one of the signature features of environmental
problems is that the person or firm that invests in solving them cannot
capture all, or even most, of the benefits of doing so, as environmental
problems involve "public goods" enjoyed by all. The implication of this
"public goods" analysis is that profit-maximizing firms will
not
undertake large-scale environmentally protective measures on their own
initiative. All in all, without a good deal of empirical information about
voluntary toxin control undertaken by firms (information not apparent
in any of Tengs and Graham's research discussed here), it would be
unreasonable to assume that such voluntary behavior occurs and that it
costs what Graham says toxin control costs. Yet Tengs' statement
suggests that this is precisely what they did, without explaining the
reasoning behind such a problematic assumption and without revealing
Testimony"].
30

See Tammy 0. Tengs, Dying Too Soon: How Cost-Effectiveness Analysis Can Save
Lives, National Center for Policy Analysis Report No. 204, at 6, tbl. II (May 1997) (available
at <http://www.ncpa.org/s204.html>) (showing assumption of "100%" implementation of
invalidated asbestos rule).
31 Tengs' Testimony, supra n. 29, at 8.
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the identity or area of expertise of any of the "experts" who
purportedly endorsed this assumption.
In sum, for at least 59 of the 90 environmental measures considered
by Tengs and Graham, the authors assumed that the measures were at
least partially implemented even though no agency ever required this.
This means that Tengs and Graham assumed that the costs associated
with these measures could be transferred to other activities and
programs, and thus produce either life-saving or money-saving
opportunities. But the assumption of voluntary implementation by
firms is implausible. If that conclusion is correct, then Tengs and
Graham took money from places where it was not being spent in order
to produce artificial life-saving or money-saving opportunities
elsewhere.
The opacity of Tengs and Graham's "opportunity costs" study on
the question of percent implementation, and their subsequent
declinations to explain their conclusions and reasoning on this point,
make it impossible to draw more specific and critical conclusions about
this aspect of their research. One can observe, as noted above, that they
treated many unimplemented regulatory interventions as if they had
been implemented. One could also wonder whether Tengs and Graham
made the quite opposite error of treating some unimplemented
measures as if they were infinitely expandable, or at least capable of
being implemented in more circumstances than is practically achievable.
But without more informatioh in the study or from the authors
themselves, it is impossible to confirm such speculations.
Tengs and Graham's research almost certainly overstated life-saving
and money-saving opportunities in another way as well. Tengs and
Graham's first study did not in fact look at 587 different interventions.
In numerous cases, Tengs and Graham examined the very same lifesaving measure, but from the perspective of different analysts. These
analysts obviously had very different views about the costs and
effectiveness of the very same life-saving measures. For example, Tengs
and Graham report two estimates of the cost per life-year saved of a
ban on urea-formaldehyde foam insulation in homes: one estimate puts
the cost at $11,000 per life-year saved, and another at $220,000 per
life-year saved. 3 2 Tengs and Graham also offer two estimates of the
32 Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions, suepra n. 5, at 377, app. A.
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cost-effectiveness of controlling arsenic emissions at glass plants: one
estimate (for "glass manufacturing plants") is $2.3 million per life-year
saved and the other (for "glass plants") is $51 million per life-year
saved. 3 3 "Glass plants" and "glass manufacturing plants" are one and
34
the same in EPA's regulations.
Likewise, in "The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social
Investments in Life-Saving," many life-saving measures appear more
than once, even though only one such measure would ever be
undertaken or even proposed. Arsenic emission controls at glass plants
appear twice on the list; arsenic emission controls at primary copper
smelters appears three times; benzene emission controls at chemical
manufacturing process vents appears twice; benzene controls at bulk
gasoline plants and at bulk gasoline terminals both appear twice;
radionuclide controls at elemental phosphorous plants appears a
stunning five times; and radionuclide controls at coal-fired industrial
and utility boilers appears thrice and twice, respectively.
Tengs and Graham provide no guidance as to how one might
choose between these strikingly different perspectives on the costeffectiveness of the very same life-saving measures. They also do not
face up to the strange consequence of their duplication of life-saving
measures. One might conclude that we could save a large amount of
money in arsenic control simply by adopting the views of the $2 million
analyst rather than the $51 million analyst. Once again, given the
limited information provided by Tengs and Graham, it is impossible to
determine what role these duplications played in Tengs and Graham's
results. The most that can be said is that if Tengs and Graham assumed
that resources could be saved simply by choosing one expert's views
over another's, this would again lead to an overstatement of life-saving
and money-saving opportunities.
Limited Set of Interventions
As explained later in this article, many people, including Graham
himself, have used the "Opportunity Costs" study to launch a largescale attack on environmentally protective programs. Not only does this
33

Id.
See Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 Yale L.J. 1981, 2013
(1998).

34
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attack ignore the fact that the vast majority of the environmental
measures included in this study were never implemented, it also ignores
the extremely limited scope of Tengs and Graham's analysis insofar as
it applies to environmental measures. Although 90 of the 185 measures
in the "Opportunity Costs" study were environmental measures thus, superficially suggesting a rather comprehensive look at
environmental regulation - fifty (over one-halo of these measures were
(or would have been, if they had ever been adopted) implemented
under just one provision of one environmental statute, section 112 of
the Clean Air Act, dealing with hazardous air pollutants. Moreover,
Tengs and Graham's analysis applies to measures undertaken (or,
rather, not undertaken) under an earlier version of section 112 which
no longer exists when the statute was completely overhauled in the
1990 Clean Air Act. 3 5 In addition, thirty-one of the environmental
measures were part of EPA's nationwide ban on asbestos, undertaken
under section 6 (a) of the Toxic Substances Control Act. 3 6 That ban
was overturned in court ten years ago, 3 7 and since then, the EPA has
not banned a single substance under section 6.
To sum up, out of 90 environmental measures considered by Tengs
and Graham, 81 were undertaken (or not undertaken) under statutory
provisions that are either formally or effectively defunct and have been
so for at least a decade. Therefore, to the extent one attempts to
develop a critique of environmental protection based on this study,
one's critique will be at least a decade out of date.
Tengs and Graham's research is unduly narrow in another way as
well. As noted above, they consider three categories of private and
public life-saving measures - medical interventions, fatal injury
reduction, and toxin control - in order to see how many more lives we
could save if we spent the same amount of money on these programs
we now spend, but spent it differently or, alternatively, how much
money we could save by saving the same number of lives, but through a
different arrangement of programs. Their analytical universe not only
includes only a small slice of the array of life-saving measures we
35

See42U.S.C. §7412(2001).

36

15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2001).

37

Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1230.
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actually take, but also fails to include activities we undertake that do
not save lives, but cost a lot of money that might otherwise be spent on
saving lives.
When addressing the first problem, Tengs and Graham's research
overlooks some of the most expensive kinds of life-saving measures we
undertake today. The whole category of military expenditures, for
example, appears nowhere in their work. Yet if one is serious about
reallocating life-saving expenditures to the place where they do the
most good, then we should think hard about whether the billions spent
on, for example, the B-2 bomber is an effective means of protecting
American lives. Of course, in the current climate, questioning military
expenditures might not be a politically expedient thing to do, but
political expediency that prevents cost-effective life-saving strategies is
an attitude John Graham has purported to fight against, not to
embrace. One might also point out that military expenditures, for
example, protect national interests - such as protecting a "way of life"
- beyond the saving of human life. The same is certainly true of
environmental protection, yet this did not stop Tengs and Graham
from evaluating the cost-effectiveness of environmental protection
solely in terms of life-years saved.
A second problem along these lines is that Tengs and Graham seek
to reallocate expenditures only among programs that save lives. They
do not ask, for example, whether the billions of dollars in subsidies to
the mining, logging, ranching, and farming industries might be better
spent on, for instance, smoking cessation and childhood
immunizations. They do not even ask whether money spent subsidizing
tobacco itself might better be spent on smoking cessation programs.
Finally, given that Tengs and Graham do not limit their analysis to
regulatory programs, one must wonder why they do not consider
whether the combined billions spent in this country on soft drinks, fad
diets, leaf blowers, riding lawn mowers, and cable television might be
better spent on Nicoret gum and the nicotine patch. Suppose an
individual, in deciding whether to go to the doctor when ill, thought
very hard about the other health-improving activities for which this
money might be used (such as, perhaps, a new pair of walking shoes or
an exercise video) - without considering whether to eliminate other,
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non-health-related expenditures first. Might not that person seem a
little crazy? Yet this is the way Tengs and Graham's research proceeded.
Disregard of Many Benefits of
Health, Safety, and Environmental Protection
Another important limitation of Tengs and Graham's studies is that
they assume that the only benefit of environmental protection is to
prevent fatal illnesses in humans. These studies ignore many significant
benefits of environmental programs. Most obviously, their fixation on
fatal illnesses ignores nonfatal harms to human health. Most lethal
substances also cause nonfatal health effects. Toxic chemicals can, for
example, cause respiratory, neurological, reproductive, hematological,
and other health-impairing disorders. Not all of these disorders are
fatal, yet they are nevertheless unpleasant and costly byproducts of
toxic pollution. In addition, environmental toxins can harm ecosystems,
harms which simply do not show up in Tengs and Graham's limited
analysis.
Tengs and Graham's analysis not only excludes the many benefits
of health, safety, and environmental regulation that do not involve lifesaving; it also excludes life-saving benefits themselves if these cannot be
quantified. This often means that, in the context of toxin control, any
life-saving benefits, other than the prevention of cancer, are ignored
because cancer prevention is often the only life-saving benefit that can
be quantified. One reason why it is easier to quantify the risk of cancer
is because there is a clear end point: the subject under study - either a
human or a laboratory animal - either does or does not develop a
tumor. With respect to other kinds of human health effects, however,
such as impairments of cognitive development and reproductive
capacity, the relevant end point is not so obvious.
Moreover, even with respect to estimates of cancer deaths, risk
assessments often use assumptions that may result in the
understatement of risk. For example, one standard assumption in risk
assessment is that the population targeted by regulation has the same
susceptibility to the relevant harm as the population studied in the risk
assessment. 3 8 However, most of the epidemiological studies
38 See Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. 17960, 17966
(EPA 1996) (proposed Apr. 23, 1996).
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underlying regulatory estimates of risk have involved only white male
workers. 3 9 Women, children, the elderly, racial and ethnic minorities,
and poor people may be more vulnerable to the risks in question than
40
the relatively healthy white male workers assumed in most analyses.
To be sure, Tengs and Graham acknowledge that their analysis does
not capture all of the benefits of life-saving programs. But it is worth
keeping in mind that their focus on quantified life-years saved ignores
some of the most important benefits of the programs in question.
Whose Life Is Worth Saving?
A final problem with Tengs and Graham's studies on regulatory
cost-effectiveness involves the studies' assumptions about whose life is
worth saving. Tengs and Graham's studies do not assume that all
human lives endangered by human action are equally valuable. On the
contrary, in estimating the cost-effectiveness of the life-saving measures
they analyzed, Tengs and Graham used two analytic techniques that
embody controversial assumptions about whose life is worth saving.
First, they based their cost-effectiveness analysis on the regulations'
effectiveness in saving years of life, or life-years.4 1 Put simply, this
means that in the view of Tengs, Graham, and their co-authors, a
measure that saves the lives of the elderly is not as good as one that
saves the lives of the middle-aged, and likewise, a measure saving the
lives of the middle-aged is not as good as one saving the lives of the
young. It also means that benefits, like the prevention of nonfatal
illnesses and the protection of ecosystems, are not taken into account in
Tengs and Graham's analysis. Tengs and Graham acknowledge that
many of the interventions in their research have benefits beyond
increasing the human life span, 4 2 but the research makes no attempt to
account for such benefits.

39 See e.g. id.; see also Robert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implications of
Quantitative Risk Assessment, 1996 U. Ill. L. Rev. 103, 123.
40 See id. (citing sources).
41 Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions, supra n. 5, at 370; see also Opportunity Costs,
supra n. 4, at 169.
42 Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions, supra n. 5, at 372.
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Second, in calculating the benefits of life-saving measures, Tengs
and Graham employed an analytic technique known as "discounting."
Specifically, they reduced all future life-saving benefits by 5% per
year. 4 3 Equations available in appendices to their original research
seem to indicate that Tengs and Graham performed this calculation in
the following way: suppose, for example, that a particular measure
would save the life of a thirty-five year old, thus saving forty-two lifeyears if one assumes that this person's life expectancy is seventy-seven
years. Tengs and Graham discounted all of the years of life saved by
such an intervention by 5% per year, from the year in which the year
of life would otherwise have been lived. This means that Tengs and
Graham would have discounted the last year saved by the hypothetical
intervention over a period of forty-two years. As a result, the last year of
life saved would be reduced in their analysis to 1 / 8 th of a year. This
large reduction in future benefits is the inexorable result of discounting,
a process akin to compound interest in reverse.
Both of these analytic devices have a large negative effect on
assessments of environmental programs in particular, and both are very
controversial. Absent these assumptions, the cost-benefit ratios of the
life-saving measures evaluated by Tengs and Graham, especially those
involving toxin control, would have been very different. As noted,
typically the only quantifiable benefit of toxic substances control is the
prevention of cancer. Since cancer is a disease primarily of old age, and
since it has a long latency period, the practices of looking at life-years
saved, and of discounting future benefits, produce results that
systematically disfavor toxin control.
Discounting, in particular, can have a profound effect on the
perceived present-day benefits of actions whose purpose is to prevent
future harm. If discounted over a long enough period, even the benefits
of preventing catastrophes become trivial. For example, Tengs and
Graham's 5% discount rate means that the death of one billion people
500 years from now is less important than the death of one person
today. The logic of discounting also means that saving the lives of your
children in the future is worth less than saving your own life today.
Discounting also systematically downgrades the importance of actions
43
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taken to prevent long-latency diseases and long-term ecological harm.
Yet these long-term aspirations are among the major aims of the kinds
of programs that have fared so poorly in analyses of costs per life saved,
especially environmental programs.
It is not difficult to grasp the issues inherent in the question of
whether to evaluate life-saving programs according to the life-years or
the lives they save. The question turns, essentially, on whether one views
younger and older people as equally worthy of protecting from the
hazards of environmental agents. Our society's norms of equality weigh
strongly against offering less protection to people based simply on age
or life expectancy.
Discounting is more complicated. In discounting, one reduces the
benefit one expects to receive in the future by a fixed rate that is
designed to capture, in essence, the cost of waiting for the benefit. In
the financial context, discounting future sums of money reflects the
fact that money received in the future is worth less than money received
today because if one receives money today, one can invest it and
produce even more money for the future. One might also be impatient
to receive the money now. In the life-saving context, discounting is a
far more problematic and controversial concept than it is in the financial
context.
In their collaborative research, Tengs and Graham do not elaborate
on their decision to discount lives. In a statement responding to this
author's statement opposing Graham's nomination to head OIRA,
however, Tammy Tengs explained that discounting is necessary in
order to avoid the so-called "Keeler-Cretin" paradox. 4 4 The idea is
that if we do not discount future benefits, we will never spend anything
to save lives now because we could always put our money in the bank
now and use it to save more lives in the future. This is a specious
argument. First, the argument wrongly assumes that the costs
attributable to life-saving will not rise over time. Second, in a related
vein, it assumes that the life-saving in question can be brought about
either today or years from now; but with respect to environmental
protection, at least, the things we do today cannot be done years from
now to prevent deaths - they must be done now.4 5 Finally, of course,
44
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citation to the Keeler-Cretin paradox assumes all regulatory
decisionmakers have the same obtuse devotion to quantitative analysis
as some cost-benefit analysts do - that they will simply tote up the
numbers and, if they come out the way Tengs suggests, keep their lifesaving money in the bank forever. Ask yourself if you know anyone
who behaves this way.
In addition, even Tengs' unconvincing cite to the Keeler-Cretin
paradox does not explain why Tengs and Graham discount these
particular studies. The life-saving interventions whose benefits they
discounted would have prevented deaths predominantly due to cancer,
and would have done so by reducing exposures to carcinogens in the
air, water, and land. These reductions in exposures would
predominantly have coincided with the costs expended to reduce them.
Where costs and benefits occur contemporaneously, the case for
discounting disappears.
The controversy over the discounting of life-saving benefits is
complex, but there are three additional, basic reasons why discounting
is problematic in this setting. 4 6 First, lives do not compound the way
money does. You cannot put a life - or a life-year, for that matter in the bank and earn money on it. Although one could argue that lives
do indeed "compound" through human births, no serious scholar in the
literature on discounting advances this as an argument in favor of
discounting future life-saving.
Second, it is inaccurate to suggest that a human life, or life-year,
lost in the future is somehow not a "whole" life or life-year. If a person
dies thirty years from now due to cancer caused by exposure to arsenic,
a whole life is lost. Yet at a discount rate of 5%, analysts like Tengs and
Graham would deem a regulation saving that person's life to have saved
less than 1/ 4 th of a life. But human lives do not come in fractions.
Finally, although many people who advocate discounting purport to
do so on the basis of people's preferences, it would be surprising to learn
45 See Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present Future, 87 Geo. LJ. 2025,
2073-74 (1999).
46 See e.g. id; Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, supra n. 34, at
2043-2056; Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Our Future, 34 Land & Water L. Rev. 39 (1999);
Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Life, 108 Yale L.J. 1911 (1999); Lisa Heinzerling, The
Temporal Dimension in EnvironmentalLaw, 31 ELR 11055 (2001). All of these pieces offer a
more extended discussion of the case against discounting.
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that most members of the public agree with the idea, implicit in
discounting at a 5% rate, that lives saved in the future are essentially
trivial compared with lives saved today. Indeed, one could make a very
plausible argument that the existence and widespread popularity of
dozens of federal statutes ensuring a high level of environmental
protection belie the claim, implicit in discounting, that the future
matters relatively little to the ordinary person. Closer to home, most
parents are probably at least as concerned about their children's future,
and as anxious to make it good, as they are concerned about their own
present well-being. Discounting ignores - indeed, it discourages this fundamental human impulse.
How Graham's Research Has Been Misused
We did not conduct an analysis of the output of the
regulatory system, nor do we imply otherwise. No where
in either paper do we advocate for, or even discuss,
shifting EPA responsibilities, radon, or loans and tax
incentives. These papers are simply not focussed on the
EPA. To say otherwise is a grave and deliberate
47
misrepresentation of our work.
Many observers have misinterpreted Tengs and Graham's research.
Most prominently, they have cited the "Opportunity Costs" study as if
it shows that government regulation results in the "statistical murder"
(to use Graham's phrase) of 60,000 Americans every year. This
misinterpretation appears frequently in the academic, political, and
popular literature on risk regulation. The Senate's Governmental Affairs
Committee, for example, has been told more than once that Tengs and
Graham's research shows that a rearrangement of regulatory priorities
48
would save 60,000 lives per year.
The misrepresentations of Tengs and Graham's data began, in fact,
simultaneously with their initial publication. In the introduction to the
book in which the "Opportunity Costs" study appears, Robert Hahn
claims that the study by Tengs and Graham "compiles new data on
47
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hundreds of regulatory interventions and estimates their costs and lifesaving benefits." 4 9 This study, Hahn continues, "assesses the
opportunity costs of the current activity and determines an 'optimal
portfolio' of regulatory activity that could save more lives at less
cost." 5 0 The ink was not even dry on Tengs and Graham's study, in
other words, before it was being misused as an indictment of
government regulation - and misused in precisely the way Tengs
criticizes in the epigraph to this section.
It is not only other researchers, however, who have misrepresented
Tengs and Graham's research; Dr. Graham himself has misrepresented
his own research. These misrepresentations fall into two general
categories. First, Graham has marketed his research as if it revealed
government regulation to be the primary culprit in the misallocation of
life-saving resources. Second, he has misstated the regulatory costeffectiveness found by his studies.
AttributingResource Misallocationsto Regulation
In congressional testimony, Dr. Graham has used the research set
forth in "Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions" and "Opportunity
Costs" as a basis for calling the present allocation of life-saving resources
"statistical murder." 5 1 Dr. Graham has told the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs that his research demonstrates that federal
regulation is in serious need of reform. In testifying in favor of Newt
Gingrich's "Contract With America's" bills several years ago, Dr.
Graham stated:
For the past fifteen years, I have studied the decision
making of federal agencies responsible for protecting
public health, safety, and the environment. These agencies
include, for example, the Consumer Product Safety
Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, the
Food and Drug Administration, the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration, and the Nuclear Regulatory
49 Robert Hahn, Introduction in Risks, Costs & Lives Saved, supra n. 4.
50 I at 1, 3 (emphasis added).
51 H.R. Comm. on Science, Risk Assessment and Cost Benefit Analysis, 104th Cong. 1124
(1995) (written testimony of John D. Graham).
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Commission. Although each of these agencies serve[s] a
vital public function, I have found that the decisions of
these agencies are not always based on a good
understanding of science, engineering, and economics. As
a result, our regulatory system is far less effective and
efficient than it could and should be. One of my previous
doctoral students at [the Harvard Center for Risk
Analysis], Professor Tammy Tengs of the University of
California at Irvine, found in her doctoral dissertation that
lifesaving investments in the United States are often
inefficient. Based on a sample of 200 policies, she
estimated that a reallocation of lifesaving resources to
cost-effective programs could save 60,000 more lives per
year than we are currently saving, at no increased cost to
taxpayers or the private sector. In short, a smarter
regulatory system can provide the public with more
protection against
hazards at less cost than we are
52
today.
achieving
Similarly, two years ago, Dr. Graham joined a group of economists
in signing onto a brief filed in the U.S. Supreme Court in a case
challenging the constitutionality of the federal Clean Air Act. In that
brief, Dr. Graham and his co-signatories urged the Court to interpret
the Clean Air Act to require cost-benefit analysis of national air quality
standards. They premised their argument on the perceived failings of
current health, safety, and environmental regulation. As they put it:
both the direct benefits and costs of environmental,
health, and safety regulations are substantial - estimated
to be several hundred billion dollars annually. If these
resources were better allocated with the objective of
reducing human health risk, scholars have predicted that
53
tens of thousands more lives could be saved each year.
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In his academic work, moreover, Graham has used the research
conducted with Dr. Tengs to launch a large-scale attack on regulatory
programs that protect health, safety, and the environment. Calling the
"public's general reaction to health, safety, and environmental dangers"
a "syndrome of paranoia and neglect," Graham has chosen to focus his
disapproval on regulatory agencies rather than, say, the medical
professionals whose apparent failure to offer smoking cessation advice
to their patients results in a good deal of lost opportunity for lifesaving. 5 4 For example, he has contended that the data he has
compiled with Dr. Tengs "call for reconsideration of the toxin-control
budgets of agencies such as EPA and OSHA [Occupational Safety and
55
Health Administration].
Thus, in testimony, Supreme Court briefing, and academic writing,
Graham himself has misused his "Opportunity Costs" study. He has
suggested that this study supports the conclusion that the current
regulatory system squanders the opportunity to save tens of thousands
of additional lives every year. This conclusion does not follow from
Graham's research. As noted, most of the life-saving potential found in
Graham's research comes from reallocating expenditures in the field of
medicine, not from reallocating resources used by the EPA or OSHA.
It is a myth that federal regulation "statistically murders" 60,000
Americans every year. Yet, not only has John Graham apparently done
nothing to correct the widespread impression that his own research
supports this claim, he has also actively promoted this misinterpretation
of his own data.
InaccurateStatements About Regulatory Cost-Effectiveness
Tengs and Graham's studies include both regulatory and nonregulatory life-saving measures. Many of these measures would be
undertaken, if at all, in the non-regulatory environment of individuals
acting in their private capacities, such as doctors advising patients about
quitting smoking 5 6 or thirty-five-year-old men undertaking an
54 John D. Graham, Making Sense of Risk: An Agenda for Congress, in Risks, Costs, and
Lives Saved, supra n. 4, at 183-207.
55 John D. Graham, Comparing Opportunities to Reduce Health Risks: Toxin Control,
Medicine and Injury Prevention, National Center for Policy Analysis Report No. 192 (June
1995) (available at <http:l/www.ncpa.org/studies/ s192/s192.html>) (alteration in original).
56 Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions, supra n. 5, at 384, app. A.
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exercise regimen. 5 7 Many other measures would entail government
regulation or intervention. Indeed, in "Five-Hundred Life-Saving
Interventions," the category of toxin control consists almost entirely of
measures that might be (but in many cases have not been) undertaken
58
by the government.
There is, of course, nothing inherently wrong with including both
regulatory and non-regulatory life-saving programs in such a study. In
that case, however, one must be careful to avoid attributing the costs
and misallocations of private decisions to governmental actors. Graham
has misused his own research in this fashion as well.
For example, as noted above, the most expensive intervention in the
"Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions" study - the control of
chloroform from paper mills, weighing in at $99 billion per year of life
saved - was never even proposed. 5 9 Yet Graham has cited this
measure as an "EPA standard for chloroform emissions" and has stated
60
that it "imposes over $99 billion in costs for each year of life added."
But the "standard" was never proposed, and hence the costs never
"imposed."
In addition, in treating unimplemented environmental measures as
if they were implemented, Tengs and Graham's "Opportunity Costs"
study greatly reduces the apparent cost-effectiveness of environmental
regulation. Again, it is impossible to determine the magnitude of this
inflation based on the public record, but given the available evidence as
described above in this article, it appears to be very large.
One last point bears mentioning here. Although Tengs and Graham
devote considerable energy to arguing that we should reallocate our
life-saving resources, they actually provide no concrete examples in their
"Opportunity Costs" study of what we should be doing instead of what
we are now doing. Only by studying Tengs's unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, written under Graham's supervision, can one learn which
life-saving interventions these researchers favor. The following
observations will be limited to toxin control.
57 Id. at 380, app. A.
58 Id. at 377, app. A.
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As it turns out, most of the toxin controls that Tengs and Graham
found to be cost-effective have already been implemented. A handful
of apparently cost-effective interventions regarding asbestos and
benzene were not implemented, but these rules together would have
saved a total of only twenty-four lives - nowhere close to the 60,000
lives cited in the Tengs and Graham study. The only large life-saving
opportunity in the area of toxin control that is identified by Tengs and
Graham is radon remediation in homes, as encouraged by the
government's funding of low cost loans, tax write-offs, or other
financial incentives. 6 1 In effect, then, the consequence of following
Tengs and Graham's research would be a wholesale shift of EPA's
responsibilities from the regulation of pollution of the air, water, and
land through mandatory controls on polluters to the encouragement of
residential radon remediation, which typically involves simply caulking
basements through loans and tax incentives. Nowhere do Tengs and
Graham face up to the shrinking, indeed trivialization, of environmental
law that their proposals would entail.
Conclusion
Perhaps the most famous empirical claim in Tammy Tengs and
John Graham's research - indeed, one of the most famous claims in all
of the literature on risk regulation - is that we could save 60,000 more
lives per year if we reallocated our life-saving resources. Tengs and
Graham's empirical research has frequently been misinterpreted as
supporting a claim that we are "statistically murdering" approximately
60,000 Americans every year through foolish government regulations.
At least some of the life-saving potential Tengs and Graham have
found, however, is based on the elimination of government regulations
that were never implemented. Most of this life-saving potential,
moreover, has nothing to do with government regulations, but instead
comes from rearranging priorities in non-regulatory situations such as
the advice doctors give to patients to quit smoking.

61 See Kenneth L. Mossman & Marissa A. Sollitto, Regulatory Control of Indoor Rn, 60
Health Phys. 169 (1991).
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Tammy Tengs and John Graham have, from all appearances, done
nothing to correct the widespread misinterpretation of their own
research. Indeed, Graham himself has frequently encouraged this
misinterpretation - by telling the Supreme Court that 60,000 lives
could be saved if resources now spent on regulation were spent more
wisely; 6 2 by publishing articles that refer to unimplemented, indeed,
63
unproposed environmental measures as if they were implemented;
and by testifying that bills that would have substantially changed
environmentally protective programs in this country were a good idea
because, without such reform, we could be rightly accused of "statistical
murder." 6 4 These are not someone else's misrepresentations of
Graham's data; they are Graham's misrepresentations.
Even if Tengs and Graham's work accurately represented the
products of the current regulatory system, which it does not, their work
nevertheless would begin from premises systematically skewed against
environmentally protective programs. The exclusive fixation on human
lives saved and the discounting of future lives saved both bias the
conclusions against environmental protection - which does many more
things than save human lives and which focuses in significant part on the
future - from the outset. Moreover, Tengs and Graham's use of
prospective estimates of life-saving costs will tend to overstate costs of
environmental rules, which have as one of their goals the development
of cheaper, more effective technologies to reduce pollution. In these
ways, Tengs and Graham's conclusion that toxin controls fare poorly in
terms of cost-effectiveness when compared to other kinds of life-saving
interventions comes as no surprise; it is a conclusion that is embedded
in the very premises of Tengs and Graham's studies.
Using Tengs and Graham's research on life-saving priorities and
assuming that maximizing the number of lives with current investments
is the goal, it would appear that priorities for reform of life-saving
investments would be established as follows: first, reform health-care
expenditures; second, redirect expenditures on fatal injury reduction;
and, only as a distant third, reform our approach to controlling toxins.
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Moreover, EPA's operations would be of relatively little concern in this
schema, given the quite small contribution even a major overhaul of this
agency's priorities could make to overall life-saving results, according to
the research discussed in this article.
Curiously, however, this is not how Dr. Graham has allocated his
own resources. Indeed, as explained, he has used his research on the
cost-effectiveness of life-saving measures in arguing for a major
restructuring of our regulatory system. In addition, he has reserved a
special disfavor for environmentally protective programs. Scholars,
citizens, and government representatives who have an interest in
ensuring a high degree of environmental protection in this country
should closely monitor Graham's work as Administrator of the Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs in order to see that the built-in
anti-environmental biases of his previous work do not find their way
into federal regulatory policy.

13 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 151 [Spring 2002]

